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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 15-3720 
____________ 
 
AMER ALNAJAR, M.D., 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DREXEL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF MEDICINE; 
HAHNEMANN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL OFFICE OF 
GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION; 
ALLISON H. FERRIS, M.D.; 
RICHARD PALUZZI, M.D.; 
JAY YANOFF, ED.D. 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-14-cv-04242) 
District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 23, 2016 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 28, 2016) 
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____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal comes to us following a bench trial after which the District Court 
rejected Dr. Amer Alnajar’s claims against Drexel University College of Medicine, Dr. 
Allison Ferris, and Dr. Richard Paluzzi. Dr. Alnajar argues that the District Court 
misinterpreted his contract with Drexel and erred by admitting evidence of his work history 
and lack of professionalism. Because we find neither argument persuasive, we will affirm.  
I 
 In June 2012, Dr. Alnajar began a three-year residency program in internal medicine 
offered by Drexel in cooperation with Hahnemann University Hospital. The relationship 
between Dr. Alnajar and Drexel/Hahnemann was governed by a contract consisting of three 
documents: a “House Staff Manual,” a “House Staff Employment Agreement,” and a 
“Resident Responsibilities” form. See Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. 
1999) (finding that the contract between a school and student includes all written guidelines, 
policies, and procedures “distributed to the student over the course of their enrollment”). 
 In accordance with state law, these documents required each resident to pass 
successive “steps” of the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE). At issue 
                                                   
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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in this case is whether Dr. Alnajar took and passed Step 3 of the USMLE in time to 
guarantee his position under the contract’s terms.  
 Dr. Alnajar did not sit for the Step 3 exam prior to the December 31, 2013 deadline 
established by the contract. Consequently, Drexel issued a letter on February 12, 2014 
giving Dr. Alnajar 120 days’ notice that his position in the residency program would not be 
renewed for the 2014–2015 academic year “due to non-passage of USMLE Step 3,” App. 
386, as required by the House Staff Manual’s GME Policy 12 (13). Shortly thereafter, 
however, Dr. Alnajar took and passed the Step 3 exam and informed his superiors of that 
fact in April 2014. In response, Drexel followed its customary practice and treated him as a 
new applicant. Drexel selected another doctor to fill the position.   
II 
 Dr. Alnajar filed suit, and the primary issue at his bench trial was whether Drexel 
had a contractual right not to renew his position for failing to sit for (and pass) the Step 3 
exam before December 31, 2013. Dr. Alnajar urges that, because he passed the test, there 
was no basis for not renewing him based on his not sitting for the exam prior to December 
31, and the contract was at least ambiguous as to Drexel’s right to not renew him on that 
basis. Prior to trial, the District Court rejected Drexel’s summary judgment motion on that 
point because it agreed with Dr. Alnajar that the contract was ambiguous. 
 After hearing the evidence at trial, however, the District Court resolved the 
ambiguity in favor of Drexel for three principal reasons. First, the Court found it clear “that 
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there is a right of non-renewal that exists under the contract.” App. 1042. Second, the 
Court credited the testimony of Dr. Paluzzi that the December ‘sit for’ date was important 
because Drexel had to be able to exercise its right not to retain Dr. Alnajar at least 120 days 
prior to June 30 in order to ensure a fully staffed and properly administered program. 
Finally, the evidence showed that Dr. Paluzzi “clearly communicated” that residents were 
required to sit for the Step 3 examination prior to December 31 of their second year. Id.  
 As for the conduct of the trial, Dr. Alnajar had filed a pretrial motion in limine to 
preclude the admission of evidence at trial related to his work history and professionalism 
as irrelevant.  The District Court did not rule on the motion prior to trial, but allowed the 
challenged evidence as relevant to Drexel’s defense that it had a nondiscriminatory basis for 
declining to readmit Dr. Alnajar. 
 On October 8, after a three-day trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of 
Drexel, Dr. Ferris, and Dr. Paluzzi on all counts. Dr. Alnajar appealed.1 
III 
 Dr. Alnajar’s claim that the contract was unambiguous is a nonstarter because he 
made the opposite argument in the District Court. In response to Drexel’s motion for 
summary judgment, Dr. Alnajar asserted that the contract was ambiguous and the District 
Court agreed. See, e.g., App. 1042 (“I agree with the plaintiff that there is an ambiguity 
                                                   
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have 
jurisdiction to review that judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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that exists in the contract”). “When a litigant takes an unequivocal position at trial, he 
cannot on appeal assume a contrary position simply because the decision in retrospect was a 
tactical mistake, or perhaps a candid but regretted concession.” Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, 
Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 Alternatively, Dr. Alnajar contends that the District Court misconstrued the 
contract’s ambiguity in favor of its drafter. This argument is a red herring because the 
factfinder is to resolve ambiguities against the drafter only “in the absence of relevant 
extrinsic evidence.” 12th St. Gym, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 93 F.3d 1158, 1166 (3d 
Cir. 1996).2 Here, the District Court rightly considered extrinsic evidence and determined 
that it supported Drexel’s position. Specifically, the Court credited the testimony of Dr. 
Paluzzi that a right of non-renewal had been exercised in the past, that the mandatory nature 
of the December 31 deadline had been clearly communicated to residents, and that Drexel’s 
ability to opt for non-renewal was crucial to ensure a full residency staff and proper 
coordination with Hahnemann. The only argument Dr. Alnajar makes in reply is that Drexel 
permitted some residents who took and passed the Step 3 exam during the spring of their 
PGY-2 year to remain in the program. But all this shows is that Drexel treated its option to 
                                                   
 2 We review a District Court’s factual findings made in its interpretation of an 
ambiguous contract for clear error. Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce 
Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Sanford Inv. Co. v. 
Ahlstrom Mach. Holdings, Inc., 198 F.3d 415, 421 (3d Cir. 1999) (“If the court determines 
that a given term in a contract is ambiguous, then the interpretation of that term is a 
question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve . . . .”). 
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dismiss a non-compliant resident as just that—an option. It does not undermine Dr. 
Paluzzi’s testimony regarding the meaning of the contract itself. 
IV3 
 Dr. Alnajar also challenges the District Court’s admission of evidence related to his 
work history and lack of professionalism. He argues that such evidence was irrelevant, 
prejudicial, and confusing. 
 During trial, the District Court ruled that evidence of Dr. Alnajar’s work history and 
lack of professionalism—which included multiple incidents of absenteeism and dereliction 
of duty—was relevant to establish that Drexel had a nondiscriminatory reason for refusing 
to readmit him.4  Dr. Alnajar faults this reasoning as “purely hypothetical” with “no basis in 
fact,” since Drexel admitted that its decision not to renew his position was “based solely on 
his having not secured a passing score to the Step 3 exam by December 31, 2013.” Alnajar 
Br. 10.  
 The defect in Dr. Alnajar’s argument inheres in a distinction the District Court found 
critical: non-renewal versus non-readmission. Even if Dr. Alnajar is correct that Drexel’s 
decision to exercise its option to not automatically renew his residency was based entirely 
                                                   
 3 “We review pre-trial and trial court rulings concerning the admission of evidence 
for an abuse of discretion.” Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 4 Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, after the plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case of discrimination, “the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Shaner v. Synthes, 204 
F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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on his failure to timely pass the Step 3 exam, the Court found that the decision not to 
readmit Dr. Alnajar was another matter. As the Court noted, it was “entirely appropriate 
for Drexel to consider [evidence of Dr. Alnajar’s work history and lack of 
professionalism]” at a time when he was “in effect coming as a supplicant to the program 
and asking for consideration.” App. 1043. Thus, the Court did not err in finding this 
evidence relevant. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.  
 Dr. Alnajar also claims that this evidence proved confusing and prejudicial. We 
disagree. As an initial matter, we presume the Court considered the evidence for its 
admissible purpose. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2235 (2012) (“When the 
judge sits as the trier of fact, it is presumed that [he] . . . will not rely on [the evidence] for 
any improper purpose.”). The findings of the able trial judge with which Dr. Alnajar takes 
issue—that he was “struck negatively” by certain aspects of Alnajar’s work ethic and 
attitude, and that Drexel acted lawfully when it used that information to “exercise its 
option” to admit another candidate, Alnajar Br. 11—were well within the District Court’s 
discretion as finder of fact.  
V 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
